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Abstract
This paper points to the important role which the elasticity of aggregate capital
supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency
of policymaking in a decentralized economy with mobile capital and spillovers
among jurisdictions. In accordance with previous studies, we show that under the
assumption of a fixed capital supply (zero capital supply elasticity) the decentral-
ized policy choice is optimal. If the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive,
however, capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
A key question in the Fiscal Federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking
in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an efficient outcome (see e.g.
Oates, 1974). A striking example where this question is of particular importance is the
current debate on global warming. The failure of the Copenhagen Summit in late 2009
has impressively shown that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hardly
realizable. One might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach, where
each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy
of other countries, gives hope for an efficient policy outcome. Further important examples
of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover effects can
be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure.
At first glance, it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be
optimal. It is not only the very existence of spillovers which causes doubt. Also the policy
instruments themselves create (policy) externalities on other jurisdictions. Despite this
presumption against the efficiency of decentralized policymaking, the previous literature
provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice. An
important example is given by Oates and Schwab (1988) who argue that the choice of capital
tax rates in an economy with identical jurisdictions, mobile capital and local pollution may
indeed be efficient. In a remarkable current paper, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) extend the
analysis to account for transboundary pollution (spillovers) and asymmetric countries, and
still get the efficiency result. In their model emissions and, thus, the extent of spillovers
generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction. The
choice of capital tax rates is then distorted by the jurisdictions’ incentive for tax competition
and by the jurisdictions’ ignorance of spillover effects. But the key argument is that both
distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to efficient capital tax rates.
Our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role which the
elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays
for the efficiency of decentralized policymaking. In accordance with the previous literature,
we show that under a fixed capital supply (zero capital supply elasticity) the decentralized
policy choice is indeed optimal. If the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive, however,
capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized equilibrium. The rationale is that,
with a positive capital supply elasticity, a capital tax rate increase in one jurisdiction lowers
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the net return to capital and, thus, aggregate capital supply as well as total emissions in
the whole economy. For that reason the distortion of capital taxes due to the environmental
spillover effects is smaller than in case with fixed capital supply and no longer large enough
to compensate the distortion due to the tax competition incentive of the jurisdictions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model assumption.
In Section 3 we characterize the efficiency properties of decentralized policymaking, and
Section 4 briefly concludes by discussing the relevance of a positive capital supply elasticity.
2 Model
Firms. We use a simplified version of the Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) model1 and extend
it to appropriately deal with elastic capital supply. Consider an economy with n jurisdic-
tions. Jurisdiction indices are i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i = j. In jurisdiction i there is a
representative firm that employs ki units of capital in order to produce F (ki) units of an
output good whose price is normalized to one. The production function is increasing and
concave, i.e. F ′ > 0 and F ′′ < 0. Each unit of capital is rented on the economy-wide capital
market at the net return to capital denoted by ρ > 0. Since jurisdiction i levies a unit tax
on capital at rate ti, after-tax profit of the firm located in jurisdiction i reads
πi = F (ki)− (ρ+ ti)ki. (1)
The first-order condition of profit maximization is
F ′(ki)− ti = ρ. (2)
It equalizes the after-tax return to capital across countries.
Households. Each jurisdictions is populated by a representative household who lives for
two periods. In the first period, jurisdiction i’s resident has an endowment k¯ of first period
income that can either be spent for first-period consumption at rate x1i or saved at rate
si = k¯ − x1i . In the second period, the resident receives capital income (1 + ρ)si and profit
income πi earned in her jurisdiction, less a lump sum tax τi levied by jurisdiction i. The
1The simplification is that we focus on the case of perfectly symmetric countries, while the analysis of
Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) allows for country asymmetries. Abstracting from such asymmetries is suitable
for our purposes since we are interested in the role of the capital supply elasticity.
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second-period budget is x2i = (1+ρ)si+πi−τi where x2i denotes second-period consumption.
Beside private consumption, utility of jurisdiction i’s resident is affected by the quantity gi
of a locally provided public good and by pollution ei. The utility function is given by
ui = U(x
1
i ) + x
2
i + V (gi, ei) = U(k¯ − si) + (1 + ρ)si + πi − τi + V (gi, ei). (3)
The subutility functions U and V are assumed to be concave and satisfy U ′ > 0, Vg > 0
and Ve < 0. Maximizing utility (3) with respect to savings si gives U
′(k¯ − si)− 1− ρ = 0.
This condition determines savings as a function of the interest rate ρ, i.e. si = S(ρ). The
derivative S ′(ρ) = −1/U ′′ > 0 serves as approximation for the capital supply elasticity
ε := ρS ′/S. For notational convenience, we do not replace S ′ by an expression containing
ε, but instead use S ′ to distinguish the case of a positive elasticity (S ′ > 0 and ε > 0) from
the case of a zero elasticity, which is obtained by setting S ′ ≡ ε ≡ 0.
Capital Market. Capital is perfectly mobile. On the economy-wide capital market,
capital demand of firms meets capital supply of households. The equilibrium condition is
n∑
i=1
ki = nS(ρ). (4)
Equations (2) and (4) determine the equilibrium capital allocation {ki}ni=1 and the net
return to capital ρ as functions of the tax rates {ti}ni=1. Totally differentiating and then
applying the symmetry property ti = t and ki = S(ρ) yields the comparative static results
∂ρ
∂ti
= − 1
n(1− F ′′S ′) < 0,
∂ki
∂ti
=
n− 1− nF ′′S ′
n(1− F ′′S ′)F ′′ < 0,
∂kj
∂ti
= − 1
n(1− F ′′S ′)F ′′ > 0, (5)
∂ki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂kj
∂ti
= − S
′
1− F ′′S ′ < 0. (6)
As shown in (5), a unilateral increase in one jurisdiction’s capital tax rate reduces investment
in that jurisdiction and increases investment in all other jurisdictions via a decline in the
net return to capital. The decisive difference of our approach to the case with fixed capital
supply is that, according to (6), the increase in one jurisdiction’s tax rate lowers total
capital supply and, thus, total investment. Investment in the tax-increasing jurisdiction
therefore falls by more than it does in the presence of a fixed capital supply. Formally, this
is represented by the additional term −nF ′′S ′ in the numerator of ∂ki/∂ti in equation (5).
Emissions. Each unit of capital employed in jurisdiction i generates α > 0 units of
emissions in jurisdiction i and βα units of emissions in jurisdiction j. The parameter
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β ∈ [0, 1] reflects the degree of interjurisdictional spillovers. In case of β = 0 we have
local pollution, while β > 0 reflects transboundary pollution. The extreme case of β = 1
approximates global pollution since each unit of emissions causes the same pollution in all
jurisdictions. Total pollution in jurisdiction i is given by
ei = αki + βα
n∑
j =i
kj. (7)
Differentiating (7) and taking into account (5) and (6) yields
∂ei
∂ti
=
α[(1− β)(n− 1)− nF ′′S ′]
n(1− F ′′S ′)F ′′ < 0,
∂ej
∂ti
=
α[β − 1− βnF ′′S ′]
n(1− F ′′S ′)F ′′  0, (8)
∂ei
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂ej
∂ti
= −α[1 + β(n− 1)]S
′
1− F ′′S ′ < 0. (9)
A tax rate increase in jurisdiction i induces a relocation of capital and, thus, emissions from
jurisdiction i to all other jurisdictions. As a consequence, pollution in jurisdiction i falls if
the ’spill back’ effect is not perfect, i.e. pollution is not global (β ∈ [0, 1[). Moreover, the
increase in jurisdiction i’s tax rate reduces total capital supply and thereby total emissions
according to (9). Hence, as shown by (8), pollution in jurisdiction i falls upon a tax rate
increase in jurisdiction i, even if pollution is global (β = 1). This property is an important
difference to the world with fixed capital supply (S ′ ≡ 0). It also explains why, according to
(8), the effect of jurisdiction i’s tax rate on pollution in jurisdiction j is ambiguous. With a
fixed capital supply (S ′ ≡ 0), the relocation of capital and emissions raises (if β ∈ [0, 1[) or
leaves unchanged (if β = 1) pollution in jurisdiction j. However, if capital supply is elastic
(S ′ > 0) and if the spillovers are strictly positive (β ∈]0, 1]), jurisdiction j benefits from
the additional reduction in investment and emissions in the tax-increasing jurisdiction i.
Formally, this effect is reflected by −βnF ′′S ′ in the numerator of ∂ej/∂ti in equation (8).
Put differently, the more elastic capital supply, the lower is ceteris paribus the increase of
pollution in jurisdiction j upon a tax rate increase in jurisdiction i. This effect will turn
out to be the driving force behind our main insights derived below.
Governments. The government of jurisdiction i chooses the lump sum tax τi and the
capital tax ti in order to maximize its resident’s welfare (3). In so doing, it takes into
account si = S(ρ), (1), (2) and (4)–(9). Moreover, it is restricted by the budget constraint
gi = tiki + τi, (10)
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where we assumed that the output of firms can be transformed one-to-one into the public
good. Each government treats the policy variables of the other governments as given, so
we consider a Nash policy game in the lump sum tax and the capital tax.
3 Decentralized Equilibrium
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium with τi = τ
∗ and ti = t∗, the first-order conditions
of jurisdiction i’s welfare maximization are dui/dτi = 0 and dui/dti = 0 or, equivalently
Vg = 1, t
∗ = −α[(1− β)(n− 1)− nF
′′S ′]Ve
n− 1− nF ′′S ′ . (11)
The first condition in (11) shows that the lump sum tax is set such that the Samuelson
condition for the optimal provision of public goods is satisfied. The second condition gives
the equilibrium capital tax rate, which deviates from the full marginal damage a unit of
emissions causes in the whole economy, i.e. t∗ = −α[1 + β(n− 1)]Ve. This deviation is true
independent of whether we consider fixed or elastic capital supply.
To assess the efficiency properties of the Nash equilibrium we determine the policy
externalities, i.e. the effect of jurisdiction i’s tax rate on welfare in jurisdiction j. If the
externality is positive (negative), then starting from the symmetric Nash equilibrium and
marginally increasing the tax rates of all jurisdictions by the same amount leads to a Pareto
improvement (deterioration) and, thus, the tax rates are inefficiently low (high). For a zero
externality, the Nash equilibrium is efficient. Differentiating uj from (3) with respect to τi
and ti and taking into account (1), (2), (3)–(10) and the symmetry assumption yields
duj
dτi
= 0,
duj
dti
= FE + EE, (12)
with
FE = Vg
∂gj
∂ti
= − t
∗Vg
n(1− F ′′S ′)F ′′ , EE = Ve
∂ej
∂ti
= −α(β − 1− βnF
′′S ′)Ve
n(1− F ′′S ′)F ′′ . (13)
According to (12), the equilibrium lump sum tax is efficient since the associated externality
is zero. This is consistent with the Samuelson rule in (11). The cross-jurisdictional effect
of the capital tax rate can be decomposed into two subexternalities. When jurisdiction i
raises its capital tax rate, it does not take into account that capital flights out and thereby
improves the tax base and public goods provision in jurisdiction j. This effect is reflected by
the fiscal externality FE which is positive and points to inefficiently low tax rates. Second, if
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jurisdiction i raises its capital tax rate, the associated relocation of capital changes pollution
in jurisdiction j. This effect is captured by the environmental externality EE. Since ∂ej/∂ti
from (8) is ambiguous, the environmental externality is indeterminate in sign.
The decisive question is whether the sum of externalities is positive, negative or zero.
Adding FE and EE and using the equilibrium conditions (11) yields
duj
dti
= FE + EE = − αβnS
′Ve
n− 1− nF ′′S ′ . (14)
From expression (14) we immediately obtain the following
Proposition. Suppose the Nash policy game attains a symmetric equilibrium and pollu-
tion is transboundary, i.e. β ∈]0, 1]. If capital supply is fixed (S ′ ≡ 0), then the equilibrium
capital tax rate t∗ is efficient. In contrast, if capital supply is elastic (S ′ > 0), then the
equilibrium capital tax rate t∗ is inefficiently low.
The first part of the Proposition replicates the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin
(2009). It is a remarkable result since, with mobile capital, the tax competition incentive
of jurisdictions actually distorts the capital tax rate downwards. In the presence of in-
terjurisdictional spillovers, however, the capital tax rate is distorted for a second reason.
Each jurisdiction does not fully internalize the economy-wide environmental damage caused
by its firm (remember t∗ from (11)). The important contribution of Ogawa and Wildasin
(2009) is to show that both distortions just neutralize each other, so equilibrium capital
tax rates are efficient. In terms of externalities, with fixed capital supply the environmental
externality EE is negative and just outweighs the positive fiscal externality FE.
The contribution of our analysis is the second part of the Proposition, which shows
that with elastic capital supply the efficiency result does not longer hold. The driving
force behind this result is the impact of the capital supply elasticity (approximated by S ′)
on pollution. As argued in the discussion of (8), the larger the capital supply elasticity,
the lower is the increase in jurisdiction j’s pollution upon an increase in jurisdiction i’s
capital tax rate and, thus, the smaller is the distortion of the capital tax rate due to the
ignored environmental spillover effects. Hence, if the capital supply elasticity is positive,
the environmental distortion is no longer large enough to compensate the tax competition
distortion. Put differently, with a positive capital supply elasticity the environmental exter-
nality EE in (13) is smaller in absolute terms than the fiscal externality FE in (13), hence
the equilibrium capital tax rates become inefficiently low.
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Two remarks are in order. First, it is the interaction of the positive capital supply
elasticity (S ′ > 0) and the existence of spillovers (β ∈]0, 1]) which causes the inefficiency.
With local pollution (β = 0), the equilibrium capital tax rate is efficient even if capital
supply is elastic. The reason why we need strictly positive spillovers is that the reduction
of pollution in jurisdiction j, which causes the decisive decrease in the environmental ex-
ternality, comes from the negative effect of the capital supply elasticity on investment and
emissions in jurisdiction i, and this effect translates into a fall of pollution in jurisdiction
j only if spillovers are strictly positive. Remember our discussion of equation (8). Second,
an increase in the number of jurisdictions tends to aggravate the distortion of capital tax
rates. From (14) we see that the policy externality which jurisdiction i inflicts on one single
other jurisdiction becomes smaller as n increases. But the number of jurisdictions which
are harmed by the ignorance of jurisdiction i increases. Hence, decisive is the sum of exter-
nalities inflicted on all other jurisdictions, (n − 1)(∂uj/∂ti), and this sum is increasing in
n. Roughly speaking, in economies with many relatively small jurisdictions the inefficiency
therefore tends to be more severe than in economies with few relatively large jurisdictions.
4 Relevance
The assumption of a positive capital supply elasticity has intensively been used in the
theoretical literature. An important example is the analysis of Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002) who point out that the relation of horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in
federal states crucially depends on the capital supply elasticity. Empirically, the evidence
is mixed. A much-cited estimate for the capital supply elasticity is 0.4 found by Boskin
(1978). Bernheim (2002) argues that the estimates range from values close to zero up to
0.4, whereas Gylfason (1993) reports estimated values significantly larger than one. Taking
this mixed observations literally, our analysis can best be understood as complementing the
previous literature. While the efficiency result of e.g. Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) is relevant
for all economies where the capital supply elasticity has been found to be negligible, our
analysis suggests that for economies with significantly positive capital supply elasticities it
cannot be expected that decentralized policymaking yields an efficient outcome.
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